migration law, 9 few treatments have attempted to sharpen the analysis through inquiry into convergence and divergence around specific norms and principles. Section I of this essay seeks to chart out an initial such analysis, conducting a concise comparison of particular rules affecting migrant workers from different realms of international law. Section I concludes with both a graphic representation of doctrinal convergences and divergences, and a further discussion the doctrinal relationships among treaties as elucidated through consideration of hypothetical legal disputes.' 0 The article considers the convergence/divergence question not only on the level of positive law and doctrine but also at the level of normative analysis. Attention to laws as norms gives proper place to the axiom recognized across numerous domains-from constitutionalists" to critical theorists1 2 to social scientists 3 -that the ideas that laws attempt to embody or enforce harbor their own power, as aspirations towards our higher selvesl 4 or as evidence of our limitations and fears. International lawyers know this perhaps best of all, as the salience of international legal rules as norms can precede or exceed their effectiveness as rules of positive law.
Labor of course particularly lends itself to this convergence/divergence analysis.
Though international labor law, and most centrally the International Labor Organization, have occupied an historically primary role in establishing legal standards on the treatment of workers, over the postwar era and in particular in the late twentieth century's era of globalization, 5 multiple regimes in other domains of international law have established rules and practices that significantly affect labor. The proliferation of international rules affecting labor has also created political and philosophical tensions: though an international trade perspective might view labor in purely economic terms, such a view is sharply limited by competing conceptions in the international legal order that emphasize the humanity and dignity of workers and that object to the commodification of labor. 10. See infra Section II.F.
See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE (1985).
12. See, e.g., MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE ARCHAEOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE (A.M. Sheridan Smith trans., 2002).
See, e.g., DOUGLASS NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE (1990); ALEXANDER WENDT, SOCIAL THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (1999).
14. For treatments of the tension between natural conceptions of morality and justice and positivist rationality, see ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE (1981); JOSEPH RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW (1979).
See, e.g., BOB HEPPLE, LABOR LAWS AND GLOBAL TRADE 33 (2005).

E.g., INT'L LAB. ORG., DECLARATION OF PHILADELPHIA (1944) ("labor is not a commodity").
This essay will argue that even where disparate treaties converge doctrinally, they may diverge normatively and that normative divergence may be significant in its own right. Section II considers the normative implications of divergent rule systems. In particular, Section II raises the question of whether the rise of international criminal law, combating forms of illegal migration such as migrant smuggling and trafficking in persons, may support a normative divergence in international migration law between the primacy of the rights of individuals, on the one hand, and the primacy of states, on the other. This normative tension in turn marks a rift still greater than those between trade and labor, or labor and human rights: it represents the polarities of liberal legalism as a jurisprudential framework ultimately transcending sovereignty, or one that protects and legitimates sovereignty.
This kind of normative analysis is, of course, highly stylized. Legal regimes do not stand for only one set of norms, but rather reflect contested and complicated histories. International labor law, for example, harbors tensions between the "economic and the social," that is to say, an emphasis on particular industrial and workplace contexts versus broader aspirations toward justice. 17 Moreover, even where particular principles predominate, this should not be taken to discount the importance of political economy, self-interested bargaining, and historical contingency in allowing those norms to prevail or in influencing the particular ways in which norms continue to develop and change over time.
Finally, a consideration of norms explicitly articulated by the treaties or laws in question does not begin to describe their full effect, and formal principles often create substantive effects sharply at odds with their own terms. The treaty regimes analyzed in this article should be studied not only in terms of their internal complexities but also in their external "realworld" impact. Such an analysis is beyond the scope of this essay. Nevertheless, by mapping the array of international legal regimes across human rights, trade, labor, and crime that affect migration, and in describing some of their prevalent doctrinal and normative characteristics, it is hoped that the article might contribute to emerging scholarship on this topic.
I. DOCTRINAL CONVERGENCES AND DIVERGENCES
The central principle in liberal legalism's self-understanding is formal equality, and it is reflected in international law's enshrinement of the doctrine of nondiscrimination.
In international human rights law, 24. International law is greatly complicated by the existence of regional and bilateral treaties, which are only occasionally addressed in this essay. In addition, the multilateral treaties themselves are subject to highly varying levels of ratification and assortments of reservations. Finally, of course, international norms are implemented differently within particular national legal systems. Thus, this exercise can do no more than offer an initial and instructive example of this analytical framework, hopefully demonstrating its utility. A fuller examination of the applicable transnational norms within any particular system is beyond the scope of this essay. Though the treaties listed above have varied structures and substantive orientations, they each potentially address the experience of the migrant worker, and can be examined on the basis of whether and how they permit differential treatment on the basis of citizenship status (i.e., non-citizen but documented) or documentary status (i.e., non-citizen and undocumented).
A. Nondiscrimination in the Right of Territorial Entry
Most labor rights relate to the experiences of workers who are actively employed in the state party in question, but there is the preliminary question of entering the territory. It is an enduring feature of modernity, and a generally-though not universally-accepted paradox, 40 that in a liberallegal world that champions the principle of nondiscrimination as foundational, the state nevertheless may make distinctions among persons seeking to enter its territory.41 International law generally reflects this normative commitment to sovereignty, so that there is no "right to immigrate."42 From a traditional perspective, the notion of a right to enter 36. GATS defines "Mode 4" as "the supply of a service by a service supplier of one Member, through presence of natural persons of a Member in the territory of any other Member." GA TS, supra note 37, art I, 2(d).
37. the territory of a sovereign state appears nonsensical, so deeply entrenched is the principle of territoriality as a feature of sovereignty. However, this basic recognition of sovereignty is not absolute. Exceptions in international law assert differing degrees of variance from the principle of sovereign territorial control.
See infra
The "strongest" exception to sovereign territorial control stems from international refugee law. Asylum seekers and refugees often enter the workforce and in some cases can contribute significantly to the migrant labor supply. 43 For this reason, the central treaty to the international framework of refugee law, the Refugee Convention, provides refugees with both political and economic rights relevant to work.4 Because it addresses individuals who presumably find themselves in conditions of extreme duress, the Refugee Convention also effectively protects the right of territorial entry for asylum seekers, by requiring states to admit them at least on a temporary basis while refugee status determination takes place. 45 Beyond this most assertive exception, in several cases international law recognizes the state's fundamental authority to screen immigrants, but constrains those procedures according to the principle of nondiscrimination. For example, although the Racial Discrimination Convention explicitly exempts from sanction the "distinction between citizens and noncitizens," 46 the UN body responsible for interpreting the Convention has specifically invalidated racial discrimination in immigration criteria. 47 The at 172 ("Generally, of course, there is no obligation in customary international law or in human rights law to treat foreign persons as well as nationals in connection with admission") (emphasis in original).
43. For one case study of the overlap between asylum seeker and migrant worker populations, see Chantal Thomas, Migrant Domestic Workers in Egypt, 58 AM. J. COMP. L. 987 (2010).
44. See infra I.C. 45. Refugee Convention, supra note 29, at art 31 ("Contracting States shall not impose penalties ... on refugees who, coming directly from a territory where their life or freedom was threatened .. . enter or are present in a territory without authorization, provided they present themselves without delay to the authorities and show good cause for their illegal entry or presence." Interpretations by the Executive Committee of the UNHCR have further clarified that states have an obligation to admit asylum seekers at least on a temporary basis in order to adhere to the principle of non-refoulement. See U.N. HIGH
COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES, EXCOM CONCLUSION NO. 6 ON NON-REFOULEMENT (1977)
(reaffirming "the fundamental importance of the observance of the principle of non-refoulement-both at the border and within the territory of a State of persons who may be subjected to persecution if returned to their country of origin irrespective of whether or not they have been formally recognized as refugees"); U.N. HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES, ExCOM CONCLUSION NO. 8 ON DETERMINATION OF REFUGEE STATUS (1977) (laying out guidelines that would allow states to comply with the principle of non-refoulement, including the obligation to allow an asylum-seeker to remain in the territory at least temporarily while her refugee status is determined); U.N. HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES, EXCOM CONCLUSION NO. 22 ON THE CESSATION OF STATUS (1981) (reaffirming that even in cases of "largescale influx, asylum seekers should be admitted to the State in which they first seek refugee... at least on a temporary basis").
46. Racial Discrimination Convention, supra note 28, at art 1(2)). States Parties retain control over determining citizenship, as long as there is no discrimination against any particular nationality. Id. at art 1(3).
See id. 1 2. See also David Weissbrodt, The Protection of Non-Citizens in International Human Rights Law, in INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION LAW: DEVELOPING PARADIGMS AND CHALLENGES
Human Rights Committee, which monitors the Civil and Political Covenant, recognizes the right of States' parties to decide "in principle" who enters their borders, 4 8 has also recognized that the right of States to authorize territorial entry should be constrained by concerns of nondiscrimination.
49
Whereas the human rights regimes more concerned with traditional civil and political equality have extended themselves to the issue of discrimination in immigration, those aspects of international law concerned with individual economic and social rights have demonstrated more deference. In some cases, such as the Economic Covenant, the position maintained is one of diplomatic silence. 50 In the case of the labor rights conventions, both the UN Migrant Workers' Convention, and the ILO migrant labor conventions, reaffirm the state's prerogative over immigration 51 and exhort states to better enforce it so as to combat illegal immigration. ("xenophobia against non-nationals, particularly migrants, refugees and asylum-seekers, constitutes one of the main sources of contemporary racism . . differential treatment based on citizenship or immigration status will constitute discrimination if the criteria for such differentiation, judged in the light of the objectives and purposes of the Convention, are not applied pursuant to a legitimate aim").
48. The Civil and Political Covenant "does not recognize the right of aliens to enter or to reside in the territory of a State party. It is in principle a matter for the State to decide who it will admit to its territory."
Civil A definitive discussion of the status of non-citizens under UN and regional human rights treaties is found in WEISSBRODT, supra note 3. Professor Weissbrodt was also the Special Rapporteur for the UN on the rights of non-citizens.
49. Position of Aliens, supra note 50. The Human Rights Committee only generally stated concerns of "non-discrimination, prohibition of inhuman treatment and respect for family life," but has declined to specify further. Note that what is discussed in the text is only the right of territorial entry, not other issues related to territoriality such as acquisition of citizenship or residence authorization. For a detailed discussion of these issues, including the cases in which human rights bodies have allowed some forms of ethnic or linguistic discrimination, see WEISSBRODT, supra note 3. 50. WEISSBRODT, supra note 3, at 190 ("Unlike the Civil and Political Covenant, the Economic Covenant's monitoring body has not yet issued a comment clearly stating that the non-discrimination provision protects migrants.") 51. Migrant Workers' Convention, supra note 30, at art 35 ("Nothing in the present part of the Convention shall be interpreted as implying the regularization of the situation of migrant workers or members of their families who are non-documented or in an irregular situation or any right to such regularization of their situation").
52. Id. at art. 68 ("States Parties, including States of transit, shall collaborate with a view to preventing and eliminating illegal or clandestine movements and employment of migrant workers in an irregular situation."); ILO Supplementary Provisions Convention, supra note 36, at art. 3 (requiring states to "suppress clandestine movements of migrants for employment"). Indeed the ILO Convention goes so far as to call for greater enforcement of border control (id. at Art 2, requiring each signatory to "determine whether there are illegally employed migrant workers on its territory"; Id. at art. 3, requiring signatories to adopt measures to "suppress clandestine movements of migrants for employment and illegal employment of migrants"; Id. at art. 6 ("Provision shall be made under national laws or
The basis for this divergence between civil and political rights, and economic and social rights, stems from differences in surrounding context and rationale. In the case of the latter, considerations of political will and the need to avoid the treaty's rejection by antisocialist states may have informed the greater deference. In addition to this essentially negative reason, however, lies both the positive concern for the well-being of all workers, and the desire to avoid the erosion of some workers' bargaining power through the presence of others more easily exploitable.
Coming to international trade, the World Trade Organization does generally reserve to members the right to "regulate the entry" of workers who would otherwise be covered under the General Agreement on Trade in Services, in the GATS Annex on the Movement of Natural Persons. 54 For workers who are employed in temporary contracts under sectors that Members have included in their specific commitments, Members can regulate entry only provided that such regulation does not "nullify or impair the benefits" accorded by that commitment.ss That is, if particular sectors have been included under GATS's other commitments, workers "shall be allowed to provide" those services and any entry regulations would not be permitted to bar them from doing so.
56
This obligation still generally preserves the territorial sovereignty of Members: it just means that they regulations for the effective detection of the illegal employment of migrant workers and for the definition and the application of administrative, civil and penal sanctions")).
53. Awareness of the negative effect of differences in labor standards on the preservation of labor standards-in other words, the danger of a "race to the bottom" driven by competition-has appeared with regularity in the history and text of the ILO. See, e.g., NICOLAS VALTICOS, INTERNATIONAL LABOUR LAW 20 (1979) ("One of the oldest ideas advanced in favor of international conventions in the field of labour was that of international competition... international agreements in the field of labour would avoid international competition from taking place to the disadvantage of workers, by a kind of inhuman 'dumping."'). The importance of uniform minimum standards below which labor markets cannot go is reflected in the 1919 ILO constitution ("the failure of any nation to adopt human conditions of labour is an obstacle in the way of other nations which desire to improve the conditions in their own countries" and in the 1944 ILO Declaration of Philadelphia ("poverty anywhere constitutes a danger to prosperity everywhere."). The ILO's position on competition modified over the years toward an endorsement of "constructive competition." See BOB HEPPLE, LABOR LAWS AND GLOBAL TRADE 33 (2005) (explaining that the "argument for international standards as a means of regularing competition" was more prominent in the ILO's founding than in subsequent eras). Nevertheless, even in this more moderate context international standards are deemed important in "preventing destructive competition." Id. (emphasis added). Although the Migration for Employment Convention addresses workers of disparate nationalities in a single market, as opposed to workers across disparate nations, a similar logic would seem to apply. 55. See id; see also TRACHTMAN, supra note 10, at 247. 56. Joel Trachtman interprets the MONP Annex to establish a higher standard than only "does not nullify or impair"; he would also add a "necessity test" i.e. that the entry regulation would need to be necessary which has been interpreted to mean the least possible trade restrictive. TRACHTMAN, supra note 10, at 244 (considering past WTO jurisprudence). cannot give commitments under the schedules but then take them away with onerous entry requirements.
The GATS does recognize the WTO's general requirement of nondiscrimination among Members (the "most-favored nation principle"). However, it also specifies that Members can, at the least, impose differential visa requirements for nationals of different Members.
7
Whereas treaty bodies have interpreted international civil and political rights to bar discrimination in immigration criteria, the trade law of the GATS would appear to establish a weaker non-discrimination constraint, albeit one that at least theoretically could apply to any non-visa immigration requirements that differentiate on the basis of nationality.
In addition to these explicit constraints on the sovereign prerogative of territorial control, international law has created an implicit, but ultimately more powerful, constraint in some cases by decoupling the right to authorize entry with the rights enjoyed by workers once in a state's territory. In some cases, the fact of unlawful entry or residence does not necessarily deprive migrant workers of certain rights under international law, as is discussed in the next sections.
B. The General Right to Nondiscrimination
Once migrants have entered the territory, there are several specific categories of enumerated rights that are relevant to their experiences as workers: there are the civil and political rights related to trade union organizing; economic and social rights related to minimum standards and conditions of work; and criminal process rights. These are discussed below in turn, and treaties vary in their substantive expressions in each of these categories. Apart from these more specific rights, however, there is the general question of the scope of nondiscrimination as a general, catchall principle applying to migrant workers.
In the area of human rights, both the Civil and Political Covenant, and the Economic Covenant, recognize the general right of all human beings to nondiscrimination without distinction based on national origin, birth or "other status." 5 8 The Human Rights Committee has clarified that "other status" in the Civil and Political Covenant includes the distinction between 57. See MONP Annex, supra note 56, at n.1 ("the sole fact of requiring a visa for natural persons of certain Members and not for those of others shall not be regarded as nullifying or impairing benefits under" GATS obligations). In addition, Members appear to retain total control over measures specifying residence and permanent employment requirements, as well as over workers who are seeking employment rather than already employed. Id. 1 3. citizens and aliens, 9 with only a narrow exception for the right to vote. 60 Moreover, this equality extends to undocumented immigrants as well, according to the Committee, with only one exception of the right to freedom of movement. 61 As with the right of entry described above, the Economic Covenant is much more circumspect: the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights has declined to comment on the application of the Economic Covenant rights to non-nationals more generally. Moreover, the treaty explicitly grants developing countries the right to exclude non-nationals. 6 2 In the case of the Migrant Workers' Convention, the question of nondiscrimination between citizens and aliens does not arise because, by definition of its scope, the Convention applies only to aliens. The question then is whether there may be discrimination among classes of aliens. The same term that exists in the Covenants, "other status," is used to define the Convention's scope of application of the Migrant Workers' Convention, but with the important qualification "except as otherwise provided hereafter," 63 and the "hereafter" in question clearly demarcates rights into those that apply to all workers regardless of documentary status, 64 and those that 59. General Comment 15 on the Position of Aliens under the Covenant (Apr. 11, 1986), T 1, reproduced in UN Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.1. The Comment states that "the general rule is that each one of the rights of the Covenant must be guaranteed without discrimination between citizens and aliens [but] ... the Committee's experience in examining reports shows that in a number of countries ... rights that aliens should enjoy under the Covenant are denied to them or are subject to limitations that cannot always be justified under the Covenant." ("Reports from States have often failed to take into account that each State party must ensure the rights in the Covenant to 'all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction' (art.2(l)). In general, the rights set forth in the Covenant apply to everyone, irrespective of reciprocity, and irrespective of his or her nationality or statelessness."). Id. nce an alien is lawfully within a territory, his freedom of movement within the territory and his right to leave that territory may only be restricted in accordance with article 12(3)." Since this is the only place where lawful status is explicitly mentioned, one can be even more confident in interpreting the lack of explicit mention as intentional. This would support the application of the nondiscrimination principle regardless of lawful status. The familiar canon of legal interpretation, exclusio unio inclusio alterius can be applied to conclude that the fact that lawful status is mentioned here but not elsewhere suggests that with respect to the other principles, lawful status is not a basis for distinction. This interpretation is supported by David Weissbrodt, apply to migrant workers who are "documented or in a regular situation."65 Although there is a separate sub-section preceding the lists of substantive rights that exists solely to set forth a general non-discrimination commitment, 66 that general principle cannot apply to documentary status given the treaty's allocation of substantive rights explicitly on the basis of documentary status. 67 The "rights provided for in the present Convention" 68 do distinguish between documented and undocumented workers, providing to the documented workers rights relating to access to educational, vocational, housing, and health institutions and services, as well as certain labor protections.
International Covenant on Economic
David Weissbrodt, The Protection of Non-Citizens in International Human
69
The Racial Discrimination Convention asserts a sweeping nondiscrimination provision including "other status" and does, as interpreted by the treaty body, apply to immigration and citizenship criteria linked to race, descent, or national origin. 70 If there is no discrimination on this sort of identity basis, however, the Convention explicitly backs off of the distinction between citizens and aliens.71
Again, there is convergence and divergence with apparently an underlying political trade-off in each of these treaties on human rights. The most far-reaching of the treaties is the Civil and Political Covenant. The Racial Discrimination Convention stops short of the line that the Civil and Political Covenant draws, perhaps trading off more explicit commitments on the sensitive issues of race and ethnicity for another mode of "outgroup" discrimination against non-citizens more generally. The Economic Covenant, with its yet more controversial orientation toward economically redistributive justice, expresses more deference still to sovereign prerogatives over citizenship and its exclusiveness.
Within international trade law, the norm of nondiscrimination is expressed in two key principles: that of most-favored nation treatment, which requires states parties to treat nationals of all other states parties equally; and that of national treatment, which requires a state party to forego preferential treatment of its own nationals. In its jurisprudence related to trade in goods, the WTO's interpretation of the nondiscrimination norm has been strikingly expansive, with much more liberal approaches to proving discrimination than, for example, would be the case in U.S.
65.
Id Part IV. 66. Id Part II. 67. See infra Section II.C. for more detail on which rights are provided to documented and which to undocumented workers.
68. Migrant Workers' Convention, supra note 30, at art. 7. 69. Id at art 43.
70.
Racial Discrimination Convention, supra note 28, at art. 1(1).
71.
Id. at art 1(2) ("This Convention shall not apply to distinctions, exclusions, restrictions or preferences made by a State Party .. .between citizens and non-citizens.").
constitutional law. The breadth of these principles perhaps explains why their initial scope was rather limited, to tariffs and other technical "border" measures affecting trade, and expanded only after several decades. Indeed, the GATS, with its application to labor, was enacted only in 1994 with the succession by the World Trade Organization of the original General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.
Reflecting this particular balancing dynamic, the GATS retains the broad statements of most-favored nation treatment and national treatment. Although, the general most-favored nation treatment principle applies with only a few exemptions to trade in services, 72 the more politically and economically sensitive national treatment principle (which entails competition between nationals and foreigners) applies only to those sectors falling specifically within states parties' specific commitments. These commitments can be quite specific indeed, so that states retain virtually complete control over their exposure. Once the specific commitment has been made, the principle of national treatment applies in its broad form within that constraint.
The ILO Migration for Employment Convention and Supplementary Provisions Convention make no generalized call for nondiscrimination, beyond the latter's reminder of the obligation of states parties to "respect the basic human rights of all migrant workers." 73 Apart from this, the principle of nondiscrimination as stated in these is limited to particular and listed rights related to the workplace, 74 as opposed to the generalized language that exists in the human rights treaties. Moreover, the ILO rights are once again carefully limited to lawful workers only, 75 removing the question of extending worker rights to irregular migrants with the key exception of terms and conditions of work "arising out of past employment." 76 This exception is important because it indicates the ILO sensibility: on the one hand, more pragmatic and deferential to states' ability to determine the right to enter; and on the other hand, with a focus on equalizing bargaining power across workers. 77 This carefully limited right to nondiscrimination may be at odds, however, with the broader language of ILO's Convention on Discrimination. 78. The ILO Convention on Discrimination defines "discrimination" to include any distinction "on the basis of race, colour, sex, religion, political opinion, national extraction or social origin." art. 1(a). The Convention also, however, accords to the state the right to determine any further extension of its
C. Nondiscrimination in the Right to Work and Conditions of Work
The Refugee Convention requires that refugees enjoy equality with nationals regarding both to the right to work, and to labor legislation and social security provisions. 79 In terms of the actual conditions of the workplace, it is not surprising that the human rights treaties differ in their level of specificity. The Civil and Political Covenant, which has the broadest purview in terms of nondiscrimination, does not include economic rights such as the right to work and to minimum standards in workplace terms and conditions. The Economic Covenant recognizes the right to work, 80 and to "just and favourable conditions of work"; 8 ' developing countries are not required to extend this to non-nationals, however, and in any case the scope of these basic rights has not been specified in cases where they would apply. 82 As for the other treaties dealing with labor rights, convergence appears on the principle that, regardless of states' obligations to non-nationals, once an employment relationship is initiated no discriminatory treatment of migrant workers should be permitted. This principle of equality for actual employment relations regardless of lawfulness is reflected in the Migrant Workers' Convention. 83 The Convention does otherwise distinguish in the substantive economic rights granted to migrant workers on the basis of documentary status, guaranteeing to undocumented workers only the right to emergency medical care 84 and the transferability of earnings upon termination of employment, whereas documented workers enjoy an scope. art. 1(b) ("Such other distinction ... may be determined by the Member"). Nevertheless, particularly subsequent to the enshrinement of nondiscrimination as a "core" labor right in the 1998 Declaration on Fundamental Rights and Principles at Work, the ILO right to nondiscrimination is understood to be of general application. For a discussion of the implications of this broad interpretive scope, see 83. The Migrant Workers' Convention grants treatment not less favorable than nationals with respect to remuneration, "conditions of work" ("overtime, hours of work, weekly rest, holidays with pay, safety, health, termination of the employment relationship"), other "terms of employment" ("minimum age of employment"). Migrant Workers' Convention, supra note 30, at art. 25. Moreover, states parties "shall take all appropriate measures to ensure that migrant workers are not deprived of any rights derived from this principle by reason of any irregularity in their stay or employment. In particular, employers shall not be relieved of any legal or contractual obligations, nor shall their obligations be limited in any manner by reason of such irregularity."
84. Migrant Workers' Convention, supra note 30, at art. 28. 85. Id. at art 32. Although the Convention does contain a provision on social security for undocumented workers, id. at art. 27, it is nonbinding, stating only that social security may be granted as long as provided for by law of state party; if state party does not allow, then Convention requests state party to "examine the possibility of' reimbursement. ongoing right to transfer earnings and savings" and treatment no less favorable than nationals in terms of taxation, 87 and unemployment benefits.
8 8 Thus, even though states essentially maintain total control over determining the terms on which migrant workers may enter, what kinds of employment they may seek, and for how long, 8 ' because the equality principle attaches upon employment, the Migrant Workers' Convention can be said to guarantee "basic economic, social and cultural rights to both regular and irregular migrant workers." 90 The ILO also reflects the norm that, though in principle states parties retain the right to distinguish between documented and undocumented migrant workers, with only the former receiving guarantees of equal treatment a priori,91 all workers are entitled to equal treatment regarding past employment. Indeed, in this respect, the ILO exceeds the Migrant Workers' Convention by including social security in this exception. 92 The ILO places another notable constraint on the state's authorization of workers, by providing an automatic regularization for workers after a period of not more than two years. 93 The ILO's final gesture in the direction of equality is to exhort, but not require, states parties "to pursue a national policy designed to promote and to guarantee ... equality of opportunity and treatment in respect of employment and occupation, of 91. ILO Migration for Employment Convention, supra note 35, at art 6(l)(a)(i), (b), (c) (nondiscrimination with respect to remuneration and conditions of work, social security and taxes). Nondiscrimination in work conditions is for lawful workers only (with exclusion of only a few particular categories; see id at art. II (excluding "frontier workers, short-term entry of members of the liberal professions and artistes, and seamen"; see also ILO Supplementary Provisions Convention, supra note 36, at art I1.
92. ILO Supplementary Provisions Convention, supra note 36, at art 9(1). Without prejudice to measures designed to control movements of migrants for employment by ensuring that migrant workers enter national territory and are admitted to employment in conformity with the relevant laws and regulations, the migrant worker shall, in cases in which these laws and regulations have not been respected and in which his position cannot be regularized, enjoy equality of treatment for himself and his family in respect of rights arising out of past employment as regards remuneration, social security and other benefits. In international trade law, the GATS system of specific commitments places no automatic obligation on states to provide the right to work or to meet any minimum standards in terms of workplace conditions. However, there is the general most-favored nation treatment rule and also, within specific commitments, the requirement of nondiscrimination in the form of national treatment. States have the ability to list exceptions in schedules, and many states use wage parity tests and economic needs tests before permitting employment of foreign nationals. 95 Rather than setting constraints on labor rights, the GATS expresses nondiscrimination in terms of the regulation of trade flows: its market access obligation for specific commitments bars the prohibition of services by foreign nationals on the basis of quantitative restrictions such as number of employees or market value of services provided. 96 Because this obligation applies only to specific commitments, however, states are free to maintain such restrictions as long as they do not commit to do otherwise, and indeed such restrictions are common. 97 For those services that are listed as specific commitments, the question arises as to whether qualification and licensing requirements might constitute disguised protectionism. GATS requires that any such domestic regulations be applied in a "reasonable, objective and impartial" manner. This is further indicated to mean "not more burdensome than necessary," unless that burden could not have reasonably been anticipated at the time the specific commitments were made. 98 Although earlier trade law jurisprudence applied a relatively strict interpretation of this "necessity test," to mean the least trade-restrictive possible measure, more recent decisions by the WTO Appellate Body have softened this approach, balancing the consideration of necessity against other considerations such as "the importance of the common interests or values protected by that law or regulation, and the accompanying impact of the law or regulation on imports or exports." 99 94. ILO Supplementary Provisions Convention, supra note 36. 95. TRACHTMAN, supra note 10, at 250. The MONP Annex allows states to "regulate entry" as long as no "nullification and impairment" which has been interpreted by some to mean "necessity test" with regards to temporary workers; to date these requirements have not been challenged as impermissible under these constraints.
96. GA TS, supra note 37, at Art XVI. 97. For example, the United States maintains numerical limits on business visas within its HI-B and LI programs.
98. GATS, supra note 37, at Art VI:1. 99. Trachtman has noted that the necessity test as applied elsewhere in GATT/WTO has been interpreted to mean the least trade restrictive possible, (Trachtman 261) though other more recent decisions (such as the AB reports in EC Asbestos and Korea-Beef) set forth a balancing test that also with ultimate sovereignty in discretion over territorial control on the one hand, and a worldview that sees the rights of individuals as primary.
Within that general tension, further differences appear according to the particularities of each treaty system. The labor conventions, for example, peak in their emphasis on individual rights within the issue areas of conditions of work and the right to organize. The trade agreement, despite the normative clarity of the most-favored nation and national treatment principles, remains largely deferential, but peaks in its assertiveness with respect to conditions of work, as discrimination in that area is most naturally seen as a constraint on conditions of competition in line with economic concerns. The Refugee Convention states the principle of nondiscrimination more strongly than its counterparts with respect to the right to territorial entry, in keeping with that convention's emphasis on the urgency surrounding the initial conditions creating refugee status, but becomes noticeably more deferential if the criminal justice system is invoked.
We have, then, a proliferation of "self-contained"l 2 3 treaty regimes addressing one or more facets of migrant workers' experiences. In some cases, treaties appear to be converging on the legal norms applicable to migrant labor. In others, divergence is clearly visible. In still others, there is at least potential ambiguity created by silence, as when general human rights norms are not mentioned in other more specialized treaties.
These convergences and divergences can yield concrete problems of legal interpretation. Consider the following hypothetical instances of intertreaty conflict on migrant workers' rights (assuming all states involved are party to all the mentioned treaties):
1. Country X regularly arrests, detains, and deports undocumented migrant workers without a public hearing, in conjunction with the criminalization of the acts of procuring and possessing fraudulent identity documents required by the Crime Convention Protocol on Migrant-Smuggling. 12 4 Human rights groups protest that such actions violate the workers' rights to criminal due process, but Country X responds that neither the Migrant-Smuggling Protocol nor the accompanying 123. INT'L LAW COMM'N, supra note 6. 124. The Migrant-Smuggling Protocol specifies that "Migrants shall not become liable to criminal prosecution under this Protocol for the fact of having been the object of conduct" criminalized by the Protocol such as the production of fraudulent identity documents. The phrasing of this exemption suggests, however, that active participation by migrants in their own smuggling would indeed properly render them subject to criminal prosecution under the Protocol. In each of the above problems, which side would prevail? The apparent existence of gaps, conflicts, and ambiguities in the articulation of diverging legal rules from different regimes need not compel the conclusion that the legal relationship among these regimes cannot be resolved or that a single applicable legal rule cannot be identified. In other words, the divergences that result from plural legalities need not lead to a conclusion of international legal fragmentation. Indeed, to a remarkable extent, international lawyers can resolve apparent divergences in favor of the interpretive construction of a consistent, rather than conflicted, legal order.
